As a neuroscience major reading this book, I kind of felt a little bit like this book was meant more for laypeople.
I'm currently borrowing this text from a friend - Chris, my good friend and also the president of our campus atheist society and organizer of our campus's philosophy club (of 'The Uncredible Hallq' fame). I was curious about what philosophers of mind had to say about things they probably hadn't done any research about.
Descartes was an idiot about the mind. Dualists = fail! Presupposing that the mind is separate from the body fails to answer the question of 'So where is the mind, then?', and claims the mind is a separate entity. It is very simple common knowledge that the mind is simply a bunch of cognitive functions. His list of arguments:
'I am such that my existence cannot be doubted. My body is not such that its existence cannot be doubted. Therefore, I am not identical with my body. Therefore, the thinking thing that I am is not identical with my body.'
Is it just me, or does this remind me of the argument of someone who is dissociating?
'My mind is transparent to me - that is, nothing can be in my mind without my knowing that it is there. My body is not apparent to me in the same sense. Therefore, my mind is not identical with my body.'
First of all, transparency of mind is only achieved when one knows oneself, and one can have things in their mind without being completely aware that it is there at a point in time. Also, this statement smacks of ignorance of anatomy.
'Each mind is such that there is a unique subject who has direct and privileged access to its contents. No material body has a specially privileged knower - knowledge of material things is in principle public and intersubjective. Therefore, minds are not identical with material bodies.'
Again, incredibly bad logic and a twisting of the definition of knowledge.
'My essential nature is to be a thinking thing. My body's essential nature is to be an extended thing in space. My essential nature does not include being an extended thing in space. Therefore, I am not identical with my body. And since I am a thinking thing (namely a mind), my mind is not identical with my body.'
... okay, now this just smacks of really bad logic. A child can figure out the fallacies and bad connections in this shit. I'm almost tempted to stop pointing out the flaws and just make fun of this, because the flaws in these arguments should be readily accessible.
'If anything is material, it is essentially material. However, I am possibly immaterial - that is, there is a world in which I exist without a body. Hence, I am not essentially material. Hence, it follows (with the first premise) that I am not material.'
Ho ho ho, now dualism is getting into things that haven't been proven to exist. Smacks a bit of religiosity to me.
'Suppose I am identical with this body of mine. In 1995 I existed. In 1995 this body did not exist. Hence, from the first premise, it follows that I did not exist in 1995. But this contradicts the second premise, and the supposition is false. Hence, I am not identical with my body.'
This requires a definition of existence. The general fact that we exist for more than seven days is generally accounted for by a continuity of mental processes and biological processes - not every cell is replaced at one time. Bad definition of existence.
'Suppose I am identical with this body of mine. Then, by (NI), I am necessarily identical with this body - that is, I am identical with it in every possible world. But that is false, for (a) in some possible worlds I could be disembodied and have no body, or at least (b) I could have a different body in another possible world. So it is false that I am identical with this body in every possible world, and this contradicts the second line. Therefore, I am not identical with my body.'
One of my problems with modern philosophy, and part of why I tend to stay the hell away from any part of it that doesn't appear to be well-informed by science, is that it postulates about 'possible worlds'. Look, folks, there is no possible other world that we know of. Postulating another possible world is like assuming there's some sort of deity, and that's just bad science. Russell's teapot.
Bluntly put, I do not respect dualists.
The rest of the book makes me wonder whether this Dr. Kim has read much in the way of neuroscience texts.
I give it maybe three stars.
Sunday, March 2, 2008
Philosophy of Mind by Jaegwon Kim
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
3 comments:
I guess you only read up to chapter 2 of the book, and did not even read those first two chapter properly.
If you weren't able to find this obvious fact out on your own, let me tell you that Jaegwon Kim is a reductive materialist of the first order. Jaegwon Kim argues against substance dualism in chapter 2. I agree that substance dualism is wrong, but your ad hominem attacks against Descartes don't stand a chance.
((One of my problems with modern philosophy, and part of why I tend to stay the hell away from any part of it that doesn't appear to be well-informed by science, is that it postulates about 'possible worlds'.))
This statement quite evidently shows that you do not know much about modern philosophy or perhaps any philosophy.
I agree with Jason, you really do not know much about modern philosophy. When he talks about 'possible worlds' he's means something that is conceivable. The possible worlds theory is a means of interrelating conceivably and possibility. Merely a tool for discussion.
Also, if you want to discuss Cartesian Dualism then you can't simply presuppose that the mind is a bunch of atoms and nothing else. You need to try to think about it the way a 17th century philosopher would, in order to get the intrinsic value of his arguments. I do agree that dualism doesn't have much going for it (I am an eliminitavist myself) but it is an interesting topic to consider. Look up: The Zombie Argument
Holy crap. reading this just made me dumber
Post a Comment